

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0096

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SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 8, 1974
(SALT TWO - 459)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF OCTOBER 8, 1974. QUOTE:

TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION WILL ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS
OF LIMITING, IN THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985,
MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES, BANNING
THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS AND VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT.

I

THE SOVIET SIDE ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO SEEKING
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE QUESTION OF LIMITING
THE DEPLOYMENT OF MIRVS. AS EARLY AS DURING THE INITIAL
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STAGE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIET SIDE RAISED THE

ISSUE OF THE NEED TO CONSIDER AND SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING MRV/MIRVS. IN VIENNA, HELSINKI AND GENEVA THE USSR DELEGATION EMPHASIZED THAT THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM OF CURBING THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE MERITED SERIOUS ATTENTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. DURING THE PERIOD 1970 THROUGH 1973 WE TABLED CORRESPONDING CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS. AS EARLY AS APRIL 1970 THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSED TO BAN NOT ONLY THE EQUIPPING OF MISSILES WITH MRV/MIRVS, BUT ALSO THE PRODUCTION OF THE MRV/MIRVS THEMSELVES. REGRETTABLY, THE SOVIET PROPOSALS WERE NOT MET WITH DUE UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONSE ON THE U.S. SIDE.

NOW THE QUESTION OF LIMITING MRV/MIRVS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985.

ESTABLISHING APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON MIRVS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WOULD PLAY A SUBSTANTIAL ROLE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF RESTRAINING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE. UNLIMITED DEPLOYMENT OF MIRVS WOULD, IN SUBSTANCE, LEAD TO SPURRING AND INTENSIFYING THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE IN THE QUALITATIVE FIELD. UNLIMITED DEPLOYMENT OF MIRVS COULD HAVE A NEGATIVE INFLUENCE ON STRATEGIC STABILITY, WITH THE ENSUING NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES.

CONVERSELY, AGREED LIMITATIONS WORKED OUT ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY AND INCREASING THE SIGNIFICANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985, AND THE VIABILITY OF THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THAT AGREEMENT. MUTUALLY AGREED LIMITATIONS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF MIRVS COULD CONSTITUTE CONCRETE EMBODIMENT OF RESTRAINT BY THE SIDES IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

IT IS EVIDENT FROM THE STATEMENTS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION

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TION THAT THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES IT ADVISABLE TO ESTABLISH WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW AGREEMENT CERTAIN LIMITATIONS ON MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES. THUS, APPARENTLY, THERE IS A COMMON UNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE NEED TO CONSIDER THIS QUESTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TASK BEFORE US OF DETERMINING THE MAIN PROVISIONS OF PRINCIPLE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

OF COURSE, POSSIBLE MEASURES FOR THE LIMITATION OF MIRVS MUST BE IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE, FUNDAMENTAL FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS, OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THE TIME FRAME OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WHICH MUST COVER THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985 MUST ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO PROPOSE THAT THE SIDES LIMIT THE OVERALL NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES TO ONLY A CERTAIN PORTION (IN PERCENT) OF THE AGGREGATE LEVELS ESTABLISHED FOR THE SIDES UNDER THE AGREEMENT. EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH, AT ITS OWN DISCRETION, THE NUMERICAL RATIO BETWEEN ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES.

STRATEGIC BOMBERS CAPABLE OF CARRYING AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WOULD BE EQUATED TO A CERTAIN NUMBER OF STRATEGIC MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES.

II

PROHIBITING THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS A SUBSTANTIAL ASPECT OF QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS. SUCH A MEASURE WOULD ALSO BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF ESTABLISHING QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

THE POTENTIAL CAPABILITY OF BUILDING UP STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BY DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING NEW TYPES OF SUCH ARMAMENTS WOULD IN ESSENCE LEAVE OPEN A CHANNEL FOR CIRCUM-
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VENTING THE LIMITATIONS WHICH CAN BE PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT. THIS IS CONTRARY TO THE TASK OF WORKING OUT EFFECTIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985. THE UNDERTAKING OF THE SIDES ON BANNING SOME TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD ENHANCE THE VIABILITY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT AND WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO PREVENTING A NEW SPIRAL IN THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE. NATURALLY, SUCH LIMITATIONS WOULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT POSITIVE PART, NOT

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ONLY DURING THE PERIOD STIPULATED IN THE AGREEMENT, BUT ALSO IN A LONGER TERM CONTEXT. BANNING NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WILL THUS BE A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO ACCOMPLISHING THE TASKS DEFINED BY THE SOVIET-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING OF JULY 3, 1974.

WITH THESE GOALS IN MIND, THE USSR DELEGATION SUBMITS A PROPOSAL TO BAN THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS:

- LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES;
- SEA-BASED STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES;
- INTERCONTINENTAL CRUISE MISSILES;
- STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES ON AIR-BORNE PLATFORMS AND ON WATER-BORNE VEHICLES (OTHER THAN SUBMARINES);
- FIXED OR MOBILE DEVICES FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC

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MISSILES, WHICH COULD BE EMPLACED ON THE SEABED OR OCEAN FLOOR OR IN THE SUBSOL THEREOF, INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND INLAND WATERS;

- STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES OF THE MANEUVERABLE TYPE AND THOSE WITH GROUND TARGET HOMING.

I WOULD LIKE TO CLARIFY THAT LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES AND SEA-BASED STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES ARE THOSE WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KM.

OF COURSE, THE UNDERTAKING WITH RESPECT TO A BAN ON THESE TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD BE MUTUAL AND WOULD APPLY TO BOTH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION.

IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985 IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE ALSO TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF RESTRAINT BY THE SIDES IN MATTERS OF DEVELOPING NEW GENERATION SUBMARINES ARMED WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES, AS WELL AS NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS. SUCH AN UNDERTAKING WOULD, OF COURSE, BE MUTUAL.

THE QUESTION OF BANNING NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS HAS ALREADY BEEN IN THE FIELD OF VISION OF THE DELEGATIONS. WITH RESPECT TO SOME ASPECTS, A COINCIDENCE OR PROXIMITY OF VIEWS HAS BECOME APPARENT. IT SEEMS THAT THE MEASURES PROPOSED ACQUIRE EVEN GREATER TIMELINESS IN TERMS OF THE NEW TASK OF WORKING OUT THE AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN LEARNING THE VIEWS OF THE U.S. SIDE ON THE ISSUES RAISED. IF NECESSARY, WE ARE PREPARED TO SET FORTH APPROPRIATE RATIONALE LATER.

III

ONE OF THE SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS IS THE JOINTLY WORKED OUT AND AGREED UNDERSTANDING THAT VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS MUST BE CARRIED OUT BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL SECRET

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MEANS OF VERIFICATION. SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY RECORDED IN JOINT SOVIET-AMERICAN DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING THOSE SIGNED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

THIS PRINCIPLE REMAINS FULLY VALID ALSO WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING NEGOTIATED ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985, AND,

OF COURSE, ALSO WITH RESPECT TO THOSE ASPECTS OF LIMITATIONS, WHICH THE USSR DELEGATION ADDRESSED TODAY. ATTEMPTS TO REVISE OR WEAKEN THIS PRINCIPLE CONCERNING VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, WHICH HAS BEEN AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES AND IS BEING SUCCESSFULLY APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS IN FORCE, WOULD CONSTITUTE A DEPARTURE FROM WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED BY THE SIDES IN THIS FIELD, AND WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF ACHIEVING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING.

PRECISELY THIS IS THE PREMISE OF THE SOVIET SIDE.

UNQUOTE.

JOHNSON

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